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Plaintiff asserted in his Complaint in this action, that
the real property which had been previously owned by
Taggart was conveyed to Defendant, H. B. WADE (hereinafter
"Wade") as security for a loan made by Wade to Taggart.
Plaintiff also asserted that the transfer occurred at a
time when Taggart was insolvent.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Upon Motion for Summary Judgment or by Default, the
claims of all Defendants to the property other than the
claims of Defendants H. B. Wade and Edna Wade were found
to be inferior to the claims of the Plaintiff.

At

trial, the assertion of Defendants Wade that a sale of
the subject property had occurred, was upheld.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks a reversal of the District
Court's Judgment in favor of the Defendants Wade.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The evidence at trial established that Plaintiff
Wayne B. Baker obtained a judgment in the Third Judicial
District Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
Civil No. 222226, against Defendant Taggart for approximately
$45,800.00 (Exhibit P-1) and that at the date of trial
of this action, Defendant Taggart was indebted to Plaintiff
Baker for approximately $60,000.00.
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It was further established that Taggart executed and
delivered a Quit-Claim Deed to Defendant H. B. Wade dated the
19th day of March, 1975.

(Exhibit P-2)

At the same time and

as part of the same transaction, Taggart executed a promissory
note in the sum of $20,000.00 payable to Wade Finance (H. B.
Wade's investment company), which promissory note set forth
that it was "secured by a deed on property located at 234
Seventh Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah."

(Exhibit P-3)

Although

Taggart received only $10,000.00 from Wade at this date, Wade
executed an "option" permitting Taggart or his assigns for a
period of 90 days to "repurchase" the property at 234 Seventh
Avenue for $10,900.00.

(Exhibit P-4)

Wade testified that he

was not required to advance any further monies to Taggart until
such time as the option held by Taggart had expired.

Not-

withstanding this "purported sale", Taggart continues to this
date to occupy the real property making monthly mortgage
payments of approximately $450.00 as his sole "rent".
Subsequent to the expiration of the "option", Wade on
two separate occasions advanced additional monies to
Taggart totalling $7,000.00.

At each time, Taggart

executed a promissory note made payable to H. B. Wade
for the amount of the monies advanced.

The first such
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promissory note dated October 15, 1975 stated it was
"secured by home at 234 Seventh Ave., S.L.C., Utah",
with the second promissory note dated November 28, 1975,
indicating on its reverse side that it was for the
"Balance in Full for Equity in Home located at 234
Seventh Ave., Salt Lake City, Utah."
Additionally, Taggart testified that he had "no
assets in 1975" and that the value of the real property
in March, 1975 was between $45,000.00 and $50,000.00.
It was also established by introduction of a transcript
of prior testimony that on July 7, 1975, Taggart testified
while under oath before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft
that he had given a deed to his home as security for a
loan.

To date, Taggart has deducted upon his individual

income tax returns interest paid by him with respect to
the mortgages upon the real property while the Defendant
Wade, at least for the years 1977 and 1978, did not
report any rental income from the subject property or
take any interest deduction with respect thereto.
ARGUMENT
THE EXISTENCE OF AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE IS
ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
It is plaintiff's contention that the purported conveyance
of real property by Taggart to H. B. Wade on the 19th day of
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March, 1975 was in actuality the grant of a security interest
or an "equitable mortgage".

It is conceded by the plaintiff

that the existence of an equitable mortgage must be established
by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence.
Roberts, 24 P.2d 940, 942 (Utah 1922).

Corey v.

The facts and exhibits

established at trial and set forth herein meet that level of
proof requiring this Court to reverse the judgment of the
District Court.
In determining whether or not a deed, absolute on its
face, is intended by the parties as a mortgage, the Utah
Supreme Court in Corey v. Roberts, supra at 942-43, set forth
some of the essential elements to be considered:
Whether or not there was a continuing
obligation on the part of the granter to
pay the debt or meet the obligation which
i t is claimed the deed was made to secure;
the question of relative values; the
contemporaneous and subsequent acts; the
declarations and admissions of the parties;
the form of the written evidences of the
transactions; the nature and character of
the testimony relied upon; the various
business, social or other relationship of
the parties; and the apparent aims and
purposes to be accomplished.
An examination of the evidence in light of these elements
establishes by clear and convincing evidence the existence of
an equitable mortgage at the date of execution and delivery of
the Quit-Claim Deed.

(Exhibit P-2)

-5-
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A.

Continuing Obligation of Granter to Pay Debt.

De-

fendant Taggart executed at the insistence of defendant H. B.
Wade, not one, but three promissory notes, each by its terms
providing an obligation on the part of Taggart to pay to Wade
the amounts set forth therein.
B.

Relative Values.

As of the date of the conveyance,

Taggart testified at trial that the value of the real property
was "around $45,000 to $50,000" with outstanding encumbrances
of "approximately $25,000 or $30,000".
tion, page 41)

(Taggart Cross-Examina-

Thus, at the time Wade advanced the first

$10,000 and at a time when Wade did not have to advance any
additional monies in the event Taggart exercised his option to
repurchase, Taggart had an additional equity interest in the
real property from $5,000 to $15,000.
C.

Contemporaneous and Subseguent Acts of the Parties.

The most notable contemporaneous act of the parties was the
drafting and execution of a promissory note (Exhibit P-3) which
was used to make "a record of what our transaction was".
Direct Examination, pages 60-61)

(Wade

This record unequivocally

shows upon its face that a deed was given upon the subject
property as security for the promissory note.

Simultaneously

with the creation of this instrument, the parties drafted and
Wade executed an option (Exhibit P-4) allowing Taggart to "repurchase" the property within 90 days for $10,900.

(Incident-
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ally, interest at the rate of 18% upon $20,000 for 90 days
equals $900.)

Even after the option period set forth in

Exhibit P-4 had expired, two additional promissory notes were
executed by Taggart.

One note, Exhibit P-7, also sets forth

that it was secured by the real property.
Of equal importance to the existence of promissory notes
establishing secured obligations is evidence that Taggart is
and has been in constant possession of the real property since
the purported conveyance.

His only "rent" as the defendants

Taggart and Wade would characterize it, is the payment of the
first and second mortgage payments (including reserves) secured
by the real property.

Defendant Wade has expended nothing

further with respect to the real property or any encumbrances
thereon.

(Wade Direct Examination, pages 73-74)

Finally, the testimony of the parties and exhibits P-12
through P-15, inclusive, strongly support the existence of an
equitable mortgage rather than a sale.

The individual income

tax returns of both defendants Taggart and Wade as prepared and
filed with the Internal Revenue Service are inconsistent with
the assertions that a sale of real property occurred.

Taggart

claims as an itemized deduction interest paid upon the first
and second mortgage with American Savings, payments which he
and Wade claim are rental payments and whch are not deductible
as such.

Wade for the years 1977 and 1978 neither shows any
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rental income from Taggart or the real property nor claims any
interest deduction for the mortgage payments.

(Wade Direct

Examination, pages 77-78)
D.

Declarations and Admissions of the Parties.

characterized the transaction on many occasions.

Taggart

On July 7,

1975, before the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, Taggart, while
under oath, conceded that he had borrowed money from Wade and
had given as security therefor, a quit-claim deed to his home.
(Taggart Direct Examination, pages 24-25 and Exhibit P-11)

When

presented with testimony from his deposition that the transaction was a loan, Taggart tried to explain.
[Deposition Question]
"You felt it was
basically a loan and he [Wade] was secured
by the deed.
Is that correct?
A.
"No, we treated it as I said in my
first testimony, as a loan. But he [I] had
the option and I hoped to be able to pay it
back.
If I couldn't pay it back --"
Q:

"He had the property?"

A:

"He had the property, of course."

Q: But your testimony there does say it
was treated as a loan?
A: Well, I--maybe I said that, but in my
mind, I may have treated it as that, but
in actuality, he owned the property.
When questioned regarding the terms of the option which Wade
had given, Taggart testified:
I know at the time this --- at the time
that I borrowed the money, I had no idea
what was happening to me.
(Taggart Direct
Examination, page 15, Emphasis added.)
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When asked how much he had to pay to obtain the house back upon
exercise of the option, Taggart stated:

"I had to pay Mr. Wade

the amount lent to me plus the $900.00 option plus the 18%
interest".

(Taggart Direct Examination, page 19)

Wade's testimony, as elicited by his attorney, also
suggests the existence of an equitable mortgage rather than a
sale.
DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. FERRARI:
Q: Mr. Wade, I show you the document,
which has been marked as Plaintiff's
Exhibit 2 in this matter, which is a
Promissory Note signed on March the 19th,
1975. You took part in the preparation of
that document, did you not?
A:

Yes, sir.

Q: Okay. What did you intend that document to reflect?
A: That reflected the deal that Mr.
Taggart and I made.
Q: Okay. What was that deal to your
understanding?
A: The deal was that we'd gone through
this.
I was given $20,000 and an option.
Didn't give it all to him, then. Then--and
he was to buy back for this amount of
money. So, he couldn't come back and say,
well, this should have been twenty-five or
thirty.
It was evidence there of what the
deal was.
So, when I advanced him the $10,000
with option to repurchase it with the
understanding if he couldn't--if he couldn't
pay the option, then I would pay him the
balance of this money.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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Q: Now, would you tell us why you chose to
memorialize an arrangement by which you
would pay him $20,000 for his home, and he
would receive an option to buy it back in
the form of a Promissory Note?
A: Well, I had to have something drawn up
to know where we were going. And he knew,
and I knew that if he didn't exercise that
option, he was to get $20,000. And if
he paid it back, he was to pay the $20,000 back
with stipulations on it.
(Wade Direct Examination, pages 86-87)
Wade's reference to "paying it back" is language of a loan, not
language of a sale.
E.

Written Evidence.

The promissory note of March 19,

1975 (Exhibit P-3) leaves no doubt regarding the intentions of
the parties surrounding the conveyance of the real property.
Admittedly part of the same transaction, the note provides:
This note and the interest thereon is
secured by a deed on property located at 234
7th Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah.
Wade Testified that he "more or less .
language of it".

• • contributed the

(Wade Direct Examination, page 61).

Because

most of the language of the note was preprinted, there was no
accident in his choice of words regarding the secured status of
the note.

He must now be held to that very language he chose

and at trial insisted upon ignoring.
A second promissory note, Exhibit P-7, much like Exhibit
P-3 also evidences that the transactions were not intended as
a conveyance but was to be treated as an equitable mortgage.
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Finally, the option signed by Wade and given to Taggart
evidences an understanding among the parties that Taggart, upon
repayment of $10,000 plus an option fee {interest) could
obtain or redeem the property.

Although the existence of a

right to redeem is not conclusive that a mortgage was intended,
the Court held in Gibbons v. Gibbons, 135 P.2d 105 {Utah 1943)
that without the right there can be no mortgage.

Consequently,

the option further supports the existence of an equitable
mortgage.
F.

Nature of and Character of Testimony Relied Upon.

As

is most readily apparent to the Court, plaintiff has been
required to prove his case from the mouths of two biased
defendants.

Although defendants asserted at trial that their

transaction was a sale rather than a loan, the written documentation and part of their testimony suggest the contrary.
The best evidence, the written documentation created at the
date of the purported conveyance, is the clearest indication of
the parties' intention at the date of the transaction.

Al-

though defendants' oral testimony says that a sale occurred,
the written documentation is in direct conflict with this
assertion.

Would defendants now have this Court disregard the

clear language drafted by them contained in the promissory note
(Exhibit P-3) that the note was secured by a deed.
-11-
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G.

Relationship and Aims.

The relationship and aims of

the defendants Wade and Taggart are best illustrated by their
own testimony.

Taggart concluded that plaintiff had commenced

this action to get "his pound of flesh".

(Taggart Cross-

examination, page 35) and that he would have to move out if
plaintiff prevailed in this suit.
tion, page 43)

(Taggart Redirect Examina-

However, if Wade's claims of sale were upheld,

Taggart would be able to retain possession of the property at
least for an additional eighteen months.

(Taggart Cross-

Examination, page 38, Wade Direct Examination, page 89)

Wade

estimated the value of the real property to be from $100,000 to
$115,000.

(Wade Direct Examination, page 78)

Thus, if a sale

were found to exist, Wade would receive a substantial return
upon an investment of $17,000, while if his assertions are
wrong, he would only receive a return of his $17,000 together
with interest.

Consequently, the difference in the outcome of

this case meant in excess of $50,000 to Mr. Wade after excluding the amount of the encumbrances.
In summary, each of the elements set forth herein when
considered in light of the facts of this case show the existence
of an equitable mortgage.

A case similar to the facts and

issues presented in this case also supports this conclusion.

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In Orlando v. Berns, 316 Pl2d 704 (Cal. Ct. of App.,
1957), the plaintiff sought declaratory relief claiming that a
conveyance of real property had actually been a secured loan
transaction rather than a sale and option to repurchase.
Plaintiff had become substantially indebted and was in danger
of losing his real property.

He had encountered difficulty in

obtaining a loan to satisfy his debts and thereafter sought
the assistance of the defendant.

Negotiations resulted in

plaintiff deeding his property to defendant who in turn gave
plaintiff a written option to repurchase the property, conditioned however upon the payment of a stated sum and the
execution of a contract to repurchase.

Defendant thereafter

obtained a loan and used the proceeds and some additional money
to satisfy plaintiff's debts.

Plaintiff later exercised his

option and executed a contract of repurchase.

At trial the

defendant testified that the price used for repurchase was an
amount based upon the amount expended by defendant together
with a stated return thereon rather than an amount determined
by ascertaining the value of the land and buildings to be conveyed.

The court concluded that this was the "thinking of a

lender" and therefore upheld the trial court's determination
that the transaction was in fact a loan and not a sale.
A similar method of determining Taggart's repurchase price
was used in this case.

Wade wanted an amount equal to the
-13-
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money advanced together with interest equal to the rate set
forth in the Promissory Note, which had been committed to
Taggart.
In a case considered by the Utah Supreme Court, Bybee v.
Stuart, 189 P.2d 118 (Utah 1948) the Court concluded that a
deed was given as security where a contemporaneous written
agreement was entered into which set forth that the conveyance
was made to obtain a loan.

The court stated at page 122:

But where, as here, there is a written
agreement between the parties, contemporaneous with the deed, which shows the
deed to have been given for security
purposes, the court will look to the real
transaction, and treat it as a mortgage.
In this case, the parties also executed a contemporaneous
agreement, a Promissory Note (Exhibit P-3) which shows that the
deed was given for security purposes.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's action in asserting the existence of a mortgage
is an action in equity.

As such and as set forth in Corey v.

Roberts, supra at page 942, it is the duty of the Supreme Court
to examine "all questions of law and all facts revealed by the
record".

Plaintiff respectively asserts that such a review

establishes by clear and convincing evidence the existence of
an equitable mortgage.

Although the defendants offered ex-

planations of their conduct, these explanations are properly
characterized as were the explanations offered in Corey v.
Roberts, supra at page 948.
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Some explanations and reasons have
been suggested, but we deem them of the
character that usually arise after a
change of intention has taken place in the
hope of making them fit a situation firmly
fixed before the explanation was thought
of.
It is therefore requested that the judgment of the trial
court be reversed holding that an equitable mortgage was
created in favor of the defendant Wade and that plaintiff's
judgment is therefore a lien upon the real property of the
defendant Taggart.
Respectfully submitted this

r~c/

day of April, 1980.

WATKISS & CAMPBELL

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of
Plaintiff-Appellant Wayne B. Baker were served upon the Defendants and Respondent, H. B. and Edna Wade, by mailing the
same, postage prepaid, to Ricardo B. Ferrari, 1200 Beneficial
Life Tower, 36 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
Attorney for H. B. and Edna Wade, this 3rd day of April, 1980.
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